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Abstract 
 
The possibility of applying a neoinstitutional 
theory in the study of hybrid political regimes has 
been studied in the article. The authors use the 
"institutional traps" theory of Academician V. 
Polterovich to analyze the state of the post-Soviet 
political regime. The authors have identified six 
institutional traps that penetrate the hybrid 
political regime at the present stage (the 
"separation of powers" trap, the "freedom of 
gathering" trap, the "freedom of speech" trap, the 
"legislature" trap, the "electoral region" trap, 
the "federalism" trap) and have given a 
characteristic of each of them. 
In conclusion, the authors have defined the 
general framework and concepts of methodology 
and have come to the conclusion about the 
advantage of using the methodology of 
neoinstitutionalism to study hybrid political 
regimes. 
 
Keywords: Neoinstitutionalism, political 
regime, political institutions, institutional traps, 
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Аннотация 
 
В статье исследована возможность 
применения неоинституциональной теории 
при изучении гибридных политических 
режимов. Авторы используют теорию 
«институциональных ловушек» академика В. 
Полтеровича для анализа состояния 
постсоветского политического режима. 
Авторы определили шесть 
институциональных ловушек, которые 
проникают в гибридный политический 
режим на современном этапе (ловушка 
"разделения властей", ловушка "свободы 
собраний", ловушка "свободы слова", 
ловушка "законодательного органа", 
"избирательный округ" ловушка, 
"федерализм", ловушка) и дали 
характеристику каждому из них. 
В заключение авторы определили общие 
рамки и концепции методологии и пришли к 
выводу о преимуществе использования 
методологии неоинституционализма для 
изучения гибридных политических режимов. 
 
Ключевые слова: неоинституционализм, 
политический режим, политические 
институты, институциональные ловушки, 
временные институты, институциональная 
среда, гибридные политические режимы. 
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Resumen 
 
La posibilidad de aplicar una teoría neoinstitucional en el estudio de regímenes políticos híbridos ha sido 
estudiada en el artículo. Los autores utilizan la teoría de las "trampas institucionales" del académico V. 
Polterovich para analizar el estado del régimen político postsoviético. Los autores han identificado seis 
trampas institucionales que penetran en el régimen político híbrido en la etapa actual (la trampa de 
"separación de poderes", la trampa de "libertad de reunión", la trampa de "libertad de expresión", la trampa 
de "legislatura", el " "trampa de la región electoral, la trampa del" federalismo ") y han dado una 
característica de cada uno de ellos. 
En conclusión, los autores han definido el marco general y los conceptos de metodología y han llegado a la 
conclusión sobre la ventaja de utilizar la metodología del neoinstitucionalismo para estudiar regímenes 
políticos híbridos. 
 
Palabras clave: Neoinstitucionalismo, régimen político, instituciones políticas, trampas institucionales, 
instituciones provisionales, ambiente institucional, regímenes políticos híbridos. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The problems of the political life of the state have 
particular relevance. Attention to them arises 
both in scientific polemics and in the laymen 
environment. The issues of choosing the means, 
methods and techniques for exercising power 
that underlie it, of the mechanisms resulting from 
their combination, and of their general impact on 
the state life have been dominant among the key 
issues studied in the sciences, the subject of 
which includes concepts of the idea of the state, 
since the inception of the state. The states 
themselves, from democratic to despotical, 
largely differ in the set of their methods and 
techniques of exercising power, which 
determines some other differences. 
 
The political regime, which contains a set of 
techniques and methods for exercising power, 
determines the nature of the relationship between 
the state and the individual, represents the order 
of interaction between the structure of 
administrators and the administrated. A 
particularly subtle connection between the state 
and the individual, which can be traced in this 
volume, is expressed in the political regime of the 
state and establishes a circle of relations resulting 
from this administration system. According to 
the authors, the political regime of the state is one 
of the fundamental principles that form the 
structure of the state. The specifics of social 
relations arise on this basis – in particular, 
relations between power and subordination, as 
well as nonpolitical relations. Moreover, the 
specific nature is defined by a direct dependence 
on the qualitative correlation of the methods used 
in organizing the administration system in the 
state. As such, the relevance of studying the 
concept of "political regime" is based on its basic 
nature for the theory of the state and is primarily 
due to epistemological reasons: the existing level 
of cognitive practice and the type of political 
culture. Such poorly studied objective 
phenomena as "endogenous" and "exogenous" 
factors of transformation of the post-Soviet 
political regime require a systematic analysis 
with the identification of correlation 
relationships. 
 
Lack of research into the endogenous and 
exogenous factors of the post-Soviet political 
regime transformation has direct impact on the 
quality of forecasts related to the direction of the 
political regime development. 
 
In particular, the critical problem of the 
variability of political modernization arose, and 
the accents of a liberal and civil patriotic 
principle were revealed. The immediate results of 
a comprehensive research into the problem of 
transforming the political regime of post-Soviet 
Russia today are in demand both by regional 
political practice and by the choice of the 
country's development path and the role of 
Russia in the world political process. 
Consequently, the problem of rational 
understanding and systematization of the factors 
of the political regime transformation in the 
modern Russia will allow to specify the vector of 
its political modernization and transformations. 
 
The writings of H. Arendt (1996), R. Dahl 
(2000), A. Leiphart (1997), S. Huntington 
(2003), P. Schmitter (1996), G. O'Donnell 
(1994), and others made a significant 
contribution to the study of political regimes. The 
focus of the local political science is also made 
on the types and forms of the political system 
development, and the emphasis was made on the 
problem of the political regime in the modern 
Russia. The specifics of the political regime in 
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Russia in various historical periods in the context 
of the problem of establishing democratic regime 
in modern Russia were revealed in the writings 
of A. Galkin (1998), M. Krasin (2003), I. 
Klyamkin (1995), V. Sogrin (2001), and L. 
Shevtsova (2004). 
 
When studying the features of the political 
regime of Russia, special attention is paid to the 
analysis of the social foundations of the political 
regime (L. Belyaeva (2011), T. Zaslavskaya 
(2002; 2004), M. Rutkevich (2001), Yu. Levada 
(1995; 2000; 2006), Butko, 2019, and others). 
Hypothesis of research. The political regime of 
Russia at the main stages of evolution in 1993 – 
2017 represented a hybrid form, combining the 
elements of the formation and operation of 
politically focused institutions for democratic 
development with authoritarian methods of 
political governance. However, democratic 
institutions can be "decorative", and the regime 
can present reversionary political means amid the 
economic crisis. At the same time, the 
transformation of the post-Soviet political regime 
into a new quality with overcoming the 
rudiments of authoritarianism in the modern 
Russia is objectified into an irreversible process 
only under the influence of endogenous and 
exogenous factors. 
 
The goal of the article is to study and systematize 
endogenous and exogenous factors of the post-
Soviet political regime transformation into a new 
quality. 
 
The objectives of the article are the following: 
 
Identification and description based on the 
analysis of the main politological concepts of the 
idea of the post-Soviet political regime; 
research into the evolutionary specifics and 
identification of the stages of the post-Soviet 
political regime; 
analysis and systematization of endogenous and 
exogenous factors of the political regime 
transformation, their relationship in the post-
Soviet political regime; 
analysis of the ideological foundations of the 
post-Soviet political regime and changes in its 
potential in the conditions of transformation; 
revealing the uniqueness of the subjective 
potential of the post-Soviet political regime, its 
differences in the conditions of presidencies of 
B.N. Yeltsin and V.V. Putin; and ranking criteria 
for the dynamics of the political regime in Russia 
(from 1993 to 2017) in order to determine the 
prospects of transition to a new quality and a new 
political form. 
 
Materials and methods 
 
The authors were guided by the principle of the 
combined application of general scientific and 
private methods of cognition in the research. The 
following general scientific methods should be 
noted: the dialectical method, the method of 
systemic structural analysis, the formal logical 
method, the comparative method, deduction, 
induction, and analogy. The particular methods 
of research used in the article include formal 
legal, comparative legal, historical, sociological, 
and institutional. An important place in the work 
belongs to neoinstitutionalism as the 
methodological base for the study of the post-
Soviet political regime, which lies in the very 
heart of the political regime. According to the 
authors, the political regime is a combination of 
formal and informal institutions and practices. 
Unlike classical institutionalism, 
neoinstitutionalism allows shifting the focus of 
research from formal institutions and legal norms 
to the study of informal practices and the 
sociocultural environment, and thus provides 
more comprehensive understanding of 
institutions. Institutions are understood not only 
as a set of rules prescribed in laws, but as real 
"rules of the game" to reduce costs from the 
interaction between the actors of the political 
process. 
 
The theory of institutional traps helps review the 
current state of the hybrid political regime, which 
is in a number of institutional traps – stable but 
inefficient norms. 
 
However, a certain operationalization of 
concepts is required. The institutional trap is 
understood as a sustainable, inefficient 
institution. The inefficiency of an institution is 
understood as the deviation from its perfect form, 
the dysfunctional state of the institution, the 
internal conflict between formally declared 
functions and the existing ones. Sustainability is 
described by the disadvantage of deviating from 
a given state of an institution or a norm; it is 
beneficial for the political actors to maintain such 
a state of the institution, and the deviation 
accordingly incurs transaction costs. According 
to the authors, the institution is in a trap not due 
to the influence of objective factors, not as a 
result of a political or economic crisis, but it 
rather falls into it as a result of a deliberate choice 
of political actors who had the opportunity to 
influence the "rules of the game" at the time. As 
such, the hybrid political regime is actually 
permeated by a system of institutional traps that 
ensure the stability of its existence. 
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Results 
 
The study has resulted in the determination of the 
trinity of the post-Soviet political regime: firstly, 
it is a combination of means objectifying the 
form and methods of exercising political power 
in the modern Russian state; secondly, it is the 
relations of "domination – submission" and 
"political control – political freedom", as the 
development and the embeddedness of 
democratic values depend on their relationship; 
and thirdly, it is the historical form of the post-
Soviet political regime at a particular stage, 
objectified by the economic basis and the 
specifics of the political and legal culture of 
society. 
 
The following stages of the post-Soviet political 
regime evolution to a new quality have been 
revealed in its development: 
 
– "Liberal" – the stage coincides with the period 
of B. Yeltsin's presidency in 1991 – 1999. The 
unbalanced concentration of power prerogatives 
in the hands of the Institution of the President of 
the Russian Federation with the formal 
preservation of the principles and institutions 
inherent in the constitutional system; liberal 
economic policy; centrifugal processes in the 
national republics of the Russian Federation; 
diversity in the parties, and a high level of 
competition in parliamentary elections; 
– "Recentralization" is the stage of strengthening 
the vertical federal power in the context of V. 
Putin's political leadership from 2000 to 2018, 
including the stage of modernization attempts 
under the interim presidency of D. Medvedev. 
There was a characteristic strengthening of 
authoritarian trends with parts of point 
liberalization under D. Medvedev, the 
elimination of centrifugal processes in the 
regions of the Russian Federation, active use of 
patriotic ideology, and strengthening of the role 
of special services and the army; and – a new 
stage in the presidency of V. Putin since 2018, 
which synthesizes the two previous ones and 
suggests two possible scenarios of development: 
 
a) Positive (increase in political freedom 
and decentralization); and 
b) Negative (increased political control, 
mobilization of society, and 
centralization and concentration of 
power with elements of the economy 
militarization). 
 
The subsystem of endogenous factors in the 
political regime transformation has been defined: 
− Economic factor: type of economy 
(mainly according to the World Bank 
classification, including the type of 
external debt/status of the country as a 
borrower); gross domestic product in 
USD at purchasing power parity per 
capita; export of goods and services in 
USD; and import of goods and services 
as a percentage of the gross domestic 
product; 
− Institutional political factor: the 
cooperation of parties, sociopolitical 
movements and interest groups with 
political institutions, the consent of 
these political agents with democratic 
procedures, their choice of strategies 
and tactics; separation and competition 
among the state agencies or their 
interaction and cooperation; the 
specifics of the party legislation with a 
focus on budget funding opportunities, 
number of members to register, etc.; the 
presence of a leading party or a stable 
coalition (more than 2/3 of the 
parliamentary seats in the last three 
elections), the percentage of 
parliamentary seats that belong to the 
leading party or a stable coalition, the 
percentage of parliamentary seats that 
belong to other parties; and the number 
of parties with representation in the 
parliament in the last two or three 
electoral cycles; 
− Ideological factor: the prevailing 
cultural and political values and 
orientations in society; the presence of a 
sense of national identity in society as a 
condition and prerequisite for the 
transition to democracy; and the nature 
of the expressed ideological splits and 
conflicts (if any) and features of the 
ideological spectrum; 
− Social factor: a category of demarcation 
and development of social structure, the 
relationship between classes and the 
"supporting" social structures of 
society; and the inequality in income or 
consumption is measured by the Gini 
index, major socioeconomic, regional 
and other splits and conflicts; and 
− Subjective factor: real actions and 
volitional intentions of the key political 
actors, their charisma. 
 
The subsystem of exogenous factors of the post-
Soviet political regime transformation has been 
defined: 
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− Economic pressure and sanctions of the 
countries of the West aimed at 
undermining the welfare of society; 
− Financial support for opposition; 
− Information war, creation of a negative 
image of the current government for the 
population, the propaganda and 
inoculation of the desired value 
systems, either Western or Russian; 
− Impact on world public opinion. It 
includes statements by presidents, 
authoritative politicians and officials 
from various countries regarding the 
immorality of the political regime that 
needs to be influenced; 
− Diplomatic influence through 
undermining influence or worsening 
conditions in international 
organizations; 
− Attractiveness of "neighbors". For 
example, economically successful and 
stable neighboring regimes can serve as 
a guidemark for democratic 
transformations; and 
− International context, the ratio of the 
number of democratic transitions or 
throwbacks towards authoritarianism 
for the current time period. 
 
The dominance of the "instrumental" role of the 
media was measured. Such a role can 
predetermine stagnation in the transformation of 
the political regime towards democracy, which 
reduces the quality of governance due to 
weakened feedback, reduces confidence in 
government institutions, leads to political 
absenteeism, and contributes to corruption and 
preservation of problems and contradictions in 
society. 
 
A set of institutions has formed in post-Soviet 
Russia that can be classified as necessary for 
sustainable democratic development and 
political stability. However, these institutions do 
not exist sufficiently long against the background 
of a long-lasting tradition of preserving the 
rudiments of an authoritarian regime. Negative 
development criteria were also revealed: the 
young age of the minimum electoral tradition 
(since 1993) and attempts of an unconstitutional 
change of power (in 1991 and in 1993). The low 
degree of competition: the losing candidates 
received about 29 % of the vote in total in the 
2012 presidential election. The vast majority of 
seats in the parliament were assigned to one party 
– 54.20 %. The ruling party, which has a majority 
in the parliament since 2003, has not changed. 
New factions have not appeared in the parliament 
in the past three electoral cycles. The positive 
criteria for ensuring sustainability include 
lowering the electoral threshold in 2016 from 7 
to 5 %; elections to the State Duma of the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation were held 
according to a mixed electoral system. Most of 
the population is included in the election 
institution, the voting turnout is not inferior to a 
number of European countries – for example, 
France, – but it does not reach the level of 
Germany or Great Britain, minority suffrage in 
Russia is not discriminated. There were no cases 
of competition undermining in the country as a 
result of referenda on the extension of the powers 
of the head of state; the incumbent president has 
not been in office for more than two consecutive 
terms, according to the letter of the Constitution. 
As such, from the standpoint of the institutional 
foundations of democracy, the post-Soviet 
political regime occupies an intermediate 
position, clearly not leaning toward an 
authoritarian trend, but also not belonging to 
liberal democracies. 
 
Discussion 
 
The main current institutional traps of the post-
Soviet political regime are listed and analyzed 
below: 
 
1. The "separation of powers" trap 
 
The authors believe that the institution of 
separation of powers is in the institutional trap, 
because the executive branch dominates the 
legislative and judicial branches. Possessing 
strong constitutional formal powers, the 
executive branch uses informal tools to control 
other branches of the state, which should be 
independent in their ideal institutional form. The 
peak of confrontation between the executive 
branch in the person of President B. Yeltsin and 
the legislative branch was resolved in 1993 in 
favor of the president. As a result, the president 
obtained wider powers enshrined in the 
Constitution. Opposition parties have been co-
opted, and the parliament has supported the vast 
majority of presidential bills since 2000 and has 
not confronted the president. Subsequent 
consolidation of the status quo resulted in an 
increase in the barrier to the entry of parties to the 
State Duma to 7 % and more complicated 
registration of new political parties, as well as in 
the introduction of a ban on the creation of 
election blocks. The abolition of the election of 
the heads of executive power in the regions also 
fits into the general concept of maintaining the 
status quo; the executive power in the person of 
the president de facto appoints regional heads. 
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Despite the restitution of direct elections of 
regional heads in 2012, the executive federal 
government was already in a system with a 
dominant party, where the party in power fully 
supported the president’s decisions and had 
leverage over the appointment of regional heads 
through the introduced municipal filter. As of 
2018, the "municipal filter" deprived almost all 
political parties in Russia (except for United 
Russia and also the Communist Party in some 
regions) of the opportunity to independently 
nominate their candidates for posts of heads of 
the regions of the Russian Federation. Another 
important factor for maintaining the status quo 
was the change in the presidential term from four 
to six years, and the State Duma of the Federal 
Assembly of the Russian Federation from four to 
five years. 
 
2. The "freedom of gathering" trap 
 
Freedom of gathering is one of the universally 
recognized means of direct participation of the 
people in the exercise of power, but oppositional 
meetings pose risks to the stability of the political 
regime. On the one hand, the suppression of such 
demonstrations involved both internal and 
foreign political risks, from the confrontation of 
society to international isolation. On the other 
hand, the regime cannot allow democratically-
minded oppositional meetings get out of control, 
otherwise such movements can go far beyond 
declaring slogans. In the context of the research 
into the political regime, attention should be paid 
to the main amendments regarding freedom of 
gathering that were adopted after the protests in 
Moscow in 2011. Amendments were made in 
2012, both to the federal law "On gatherings, 
meetings, demonstrations, marches, and pickets," 
and to the related articles of the Code of 
Administrative Offenses of the Russian 
Federation – in particular, regarding the 
preliminary campaigning only after approval of 
the place and (or) time of the public event by the 
executive authority of the region of the Russian 
Federation or the local government body, rather 
than from the moment of submission of the 
notification of its holding (Article 10, Part 1) 
(2004), as was previously established by law; the 
introduction of the right of the regions of the 
Russian Federation to ban the holding of 
meetings, gatherings, etc. where they can "result 
in disruption of the functioning of life support 
facilities, transport or social infrastructure, 
communications, interfere with the movement of 
pedestrians and (or) vehicles or citizens' access to 
residential premises or objects of transport or 
social infrastructure" (2004); imposing the 
obligation to take measures to prevent exceeding 
the number of participants in the event declared 
in the notification and establishing the 
administrative responsibility of the organizer for 
failure to fulfill this obligation on the organizer 
of a public event; and empowerment of executive 
bodies of the regions of the Russian Federation 
with the power to determine specially designated 
places for public events. A such, the executive 
branch acts flexibly and does not pose itself with 
the dangerous dilemma of "to break up or not to 
break up", but rather only with the dilemma of 
"to permit or not to permit." A dysfunction of 
freedom of gathering is obviously created in such 
a situation – an institution that should serve as 
one of the elements of communication between 
the state and society. However, there is no 
legislative prohibition on holding meetings, force 
suppression is not used, and any detentions are 
rare. 
 
3. The "freedom of speech" trap 
 
Freedom of speech is institutionalized in the 
independence of the press. The independence of 
the media is a pillar of the democratic 
development of the regime. The press should 
help civil society control the state by performing 
a supervisory function, raise important public 
topics for discussion, investigate the abuse of 
power by officials and politicians, and provide 
participants in the political process with the 
opportunity to compete with the current 
government in the media space. In the classical 
understanding of authoritarian regimes, either the 
institution of the media is completely under state 
control, or there is a strict censorship policy 
established in the regime. The hybrid mode 
follows a different path, creating a pool of the 
most influential media outlets. They are used to 
form an alternative media agenda. Any 
opposition-minded media are presented as 
marginal, sponsored from abroad and not 
requiring the attention of the people; the regime 
is trying to "cut off" the income of such media 
from advertising revenues. The formation of an 
alternative reality with a "convenient" system of 
values for the regime becomes the main function 
of the media in the institutional trap. In the 
context of the Russian regime, the following 
specifics can be mentioned: 
 
1) Formation of a television oligopoly on 
the basis of the All-Russian State 
Television and Radio Broadcasting 
Company, the National Media Group 
and Gazprom-Media Holding; 
2) Almost the entire television market 
belongs to the segment of federal 
channels, while regional television is 
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weakly developed, and there is 
insufficient support for local media 
companies; 
3) "digital expansion" of the state (the law 
on the "right to be forgotten", Telegram 
ban, the law on the "sovereign Russian 
Internet"); and 
4) Strengthening administrative control 
over the Internet. 
 
4. The "legislature" trap 
 
Firstly, when in the institutional trap, the 
parliament almost ceases to fulfill its 
representative function, the specifics of its state 
lie in the fact that only parties co-opted with 
power are allowed into it and become part of the 
system. At the same time, there is a certain 
struggle of ideas within the parliament, though de 
facto it is not representative of public ideas, but 
rather represents a struggle of development 
courses within the ruling elite. Secondly, when in 
the institutional trap, the parliament loses the 
status of a leader in the legislative process, 
usually giving way to the government. The 
parliament does not enter into confrontation with 
the executive branch, fully supports its decisions, 
and thus loses its exclusive role in the system of 
checks and balances. 
 
The following characteristics of the 
parliamentary institutional trap can be noted in 
the context of the Russian political regime: 
 
1. The maximum degree of parliamentary 
control by a pro-presidential party (the 
United Russia fraction is 76.12 % of the 
total number of deputies) (List of 
deputy associations of the State Duma 
of Russia, 2019); 
2. The presence of parties loyal to the 
government in the parliament, which 
declare their opposition only as a 
formality. Such parties make the system 
flexible and accumulate part of the 
protest vote, thereby actually 
strengthening the current dominance of 
the party in power; 
3. The parliament does not oppose the 
executive branch in the legislative 
process, the strategy of approving the 
proposals of executive bodies prevails; 
and 
4. Miscommunication between the 
parliament and society. The parliament 
loses touch with the real needs and 
problems of society due to the absence 
of real interparty competition, during 
which the political agenda and the need 
for legislative changes are born, and 
therefore resonant bills arise that divide 
society and provoke conflicts in it. 
There is a danger of the formation of 
two parallel self-sufficient realities. 
 
5. The "electoral region" trap 
 
Electoral competition is one of the main areas of 
political competition. Tough authoritarian 
regimes try to avoid elections. However, 
elections exist in a hybrid political regime – they 
are regular, but the institution itself is in the 
institutional trap. Firstly, this contradiction 
between the perfect state of the election 
institution and the real state of affairs and 
compliance with electoral procedures does not 
lead to the redistribution of power in the context 
of the modern political regime, but only 
reinforces the existing order. Secondly, elections 
hardly solve the problem of presenting new, 
changing demands of society in the political 
programs of candidates or parties. However, why 
do not autocrats cancel elections in hybrid 
regimes? The election institution ensures 
legitimization of the regime; the level of 
falsification usually may not be too high. The 
authorities prefer the strategy of not allowing 
potentially dangerous competitors to the 
elections: such candidates fall into a situation of 
"information outcast" in the media space and are 
usually forced to boycott elections. Ensuring a 
high turnout in such a situation is extremely 
necessary, otherwise any absentee can be defined 
as a supporter of unsystematic opposition and a 
boycott strategy for elections. High turnout is 
also the main criteria for the authorities' 
legitimacy from its point of view. As a result, the 
opposition forces do not constitute a serious 
electoral threat to the authorities, and the 
elections turn out to be uncompetitive in all 
respects. The possibility of large-scale fraud is 
limited in many cases, due to the presence of 
international observers or parallel vote counts. 
 
6. The "federalism" trap 
 
In the opinion of the authors, federalism in the 
Russian Federation as an institution is in the 
institutional trap. They state a contradiction 
between the formal and informal state of the 
institution, between its form and content. The 
federal structure implies the actual existence of 
economic and political independence of the 
region, the equal rights of the regions in relations 
both among them and with the federal center, and 
the absence of complete hierarchical 
subordination to the federal center. However, in 
the context of Russian federalism, the following 
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features of federalism can be noted in the hybrid 
political regime that describe its state as an 
institutional trap: 
 
1. The prevalence of the political 
expediency principle over the principle 
of equality of regions in the field of 
budget transfers. Five regions of the 
Russian Federation receive 30 % of all 
subsidies (Mogilevskaya, 2017). The 
economic dependence of the region on 
federal subsidies is transformed into 
political dependence. The regional 
government is controlled through the 
allocation of federal funding to the 
region; "objectionable" governors are 
deprived of financial aid from the 
center. 
2. Creation of the "center – region" 
vertical of power through the creation of 
federal districts and the institution of 
plenipotentiaries of the president. As 
such, the concentration of power of the 
federal center is increasing, since the 
representatives in the districts have the 
task of controlling the implementation 
of the orders adopted by the federal 
government bodies and ensuring the 
implementation of the president’s 
personnel policy. 
3. The President of the Russian Federation 
has the power to appoint 10 % of the 
Federation Council members. As such, 
the federal government can act as a 
decisive factor in the voting on the bills 
that are disputable for some regions of 
the federation. 
4. The presence of a municipal filter in the 
elections of regional heads restricts 
popular but nonparty regional 
politicians. As such, the federal 
government can co-opt such politicians 
by presenting the required number of 
signatures of municipal deputies. 
 
The Decree of the President of the Russian 
Federation No. 193 dated April 25, 2019 "On 
assessing the efficiency of the activities of senior 
officials (heads of the highest executive bodies of 
the state authorities) in the regions of the Russian 
Federation and the activities of executive bodies 
in the regions of the Russian Federation" must 
also be noted, along with a list of indicators for 
assessing the performance of senior officials in 
the regions of the Russian Federation and the 
activities of executive authorities in the regions 
of the Russian Federation. If the performance 
indicators are reached, the region may obtain 
incentive grants for which the government 
annually allocates 20 bln rubles. However, not all 
indicators are socioeconomic, as there are also 
political ones in the list of criteria: "Level of trust 
in the government (in the President of the 
Russian Federation, in senior officials (heads of 
the highest executive bodies of the state 
authorities) in the regions of the Russian 
Federation)" (2019). Thus, the federal 
government endowed itself with yet another tool 
of influence on government representatives in the 
regions: if opposition is emerging in the region, 
it may just lose financial support, which will be 
allocated to the regions with loyal governors. 
 
The concept of intermediate institutions is also 
described in the writings of Dani Rodrik under 
the name Second-Best Institutions (Rodrik, 
2008). The concept of interim institutions, such 
as Second-Best Institutions, explains the process 
of creating desirable institutions in developing 
countries, when the "transplantation" of an 
institution is impossible due to the unavoidable 
barriers of the institutional environment. At the 
same time, any attempts to completely exclude 
the cultural component of the institutional 
environment should be critically addressed. The 
authors believe that D. Acemoglu and J. 
Robinson did this in their famous book "Why 
Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, 
and Poverty" (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2017). 
In their opinion, the nature and direction of 
institutional development depend on a 
combination of institutions with cultural 
specifics. The institutions determine the choice 
of a trajectory, while culture makes it a stable 
track. However, their contribution to the 
methodology must be noted. In particular, the 
authors will rely on the concept of inclusive and 
extractive institutions. Another advantage of the 
neoinstitutional approach is that it removes 
contradictions between the formal legal and 
sociocultural context in the factors of the political 
regime transformation. 
 
General framework and concepts of the 
methodology: 
 
1. The institutions should be understood as 
the rules that organize and streamline 
human interaction, thus setting a set of 
alternatives for the actor, reducing 
uncertainty, and minimizing transaction 
costs. 
2. The institutions can be both formal and 
informal and are in complex interaction. 
They can be extractive and inclusive. 
Inclusive institutions encourage the 
participation of large groups of the 
population in economic activity, where 
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alienation of property is not allowed. 
Extractive institutions allow the elite to 
extract rent from the population for its 
own benefit, and allow or establish the 
alienation of property or income in 
favor of narrow groups. 
3. Both endogenous and exogenous 
factors can be sources of changes in 
institutions. 
4. Interim institutions are specific 
institutions that combine old and new 
norms, operate under the cultural 
constraints of the institutional 
environment and develop new attitudes 
in society. 
5. Institutional trap is an inefficient but 
steady norm. 
 
As such, the methodological tools of 
neoinstitutionalism allow the following: 
 
− To analyze not just formally prescribed 
interactions, but also informal ones; 
take the cultural characteristics of the 
institutional environment into account; 
and 
− To identify the direction of the regime 
transformation as a result of exposure to 
endogenous and exogenous factors, 
based on this analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The political regime of the modern Russia from 
the early 90s of the 20th century to 2016 has been 
explored in the article, along with its essential 
characteristics, transformation factors, and the 
dynamic dependence of political power on 
endogenous and exogenous factors. The 
systemic, structural, functional, and institutional 
analysis used in the study has led to the following 
conclusions. 
 
As a result of the theoretical analysis of the 
"political regime" category, the authors defined it 
as a dialectical unity of political control and 
political choice, harmonized to the degree of 
political freedom. Consequently, the use of this 
term primarily provides for the analysis of 
internal power mechanisms endogenously 
inherent in political power. Besides, the 
interaction between the regime and the 
environment, as well as their mutual influence 
and exogenous factors cannot remain outside the 
scientific analysis. 
 
The nature of the political regime is defined in 
the modern science mainly by the degree of 
separation of powers in the state and the specifics 
of their relationships, the basic principles and 
methods of establishing political bodies of state 
power and local self-government, methods of 
managing political processes in society, level of 
authority of the political elite, state legality in the 
country, prevailing type of legitimacy of the 
government in society, the degree of political 
power and freedom in society, as well as a 
number of other characteristics. 
 
Endogenous transformation factors have been 
identified and reviewed in the article. 
 
The political regime in the modern Russia is 
being transformed under the influence of 
endogenous and exogenous factors. In the 
opinion of the authors, the endogenous and 
exogenous transformation factors should be 
considered from the point of view of their 
synthesis. This is due to the fact that these factors 
can exert a separate effect only in theoretical 
concepts of their study. De facto, they have 
simultaneous impact on the political regime, and 
exogenous factors can serve as a catalyst for the 
manifestation of endogenous factors. 
 
The authors have noted the establishment of a 
hybrid political regime in the modern Russia. 
The political regime in the modern Russia 
combines elements of a democratic political 
system and democratic institutions together with 
authoritarian methods of governance. 
Democratic institutions can be "decorative," but 
this imitation also occurs in another direction – 
the regime may appear to be more repressive than 
it actually is. The scientific consensus is that a 
multiparty system and regular elections are 
already the necessary criteria for recognizing a 
regime as hybrid. Therefore, the political regime 
in the modern Russia cannot be defined as a 
classic autocracy or dictatorship. 
 
It must be noted that at the same time, the party 
system still admits the desire for a single, so-
called "party of power", the political opposition 
is weak and plays actually no role (except for the 
decorative) in the political life of the country. 
Political power seeks to create conditions in 
which the media space is controlled exclusively 
by pro-government media. 
 
As a result of the analysis of the political regime 
in the modern Russia, the authors have concluded 
that a hybrid political regime is able to make a 
transformation in a democratic direction almost 
painlessly for society due to its inherent 
adaptability, in contrast to tough authoritarian 
regimes. The main goal of the hybrid regime is 
self-preservation, which is why Russia still exists 
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in an ideological vacuum, and there is no national 
idea. 
 
In the opinion of the authors, an active 
bureaucracy is a social base of the political 
regime in Russia, and the majority of the 
politically and socially inactive population has 
no mechanisms to influence political power. The 
authors have analyzed a combination of positive 
and negative aspects in the nature and 
functioning of the political regime in the modern 
Russia. The positive thing is that the authorities 
manage to maintain sociopolitical stability in the 
country, but at the same time it is not yet clear 
what resources the authorities are going to use for 
the ongoing progressive social development. 
There is reason to suppose that the national 
populist model of solving Russian problems may 
prevail if the effects of the economic crisis 
worsen. The existing considerable systemic 
shortcomings of the current political regime will 
undoubtedly impact its place and role in the 
international division of labor and the 
socioeconomic situation of citizens in the further 
development of Russia. Political democracy is 
the only prerequisite for the efficient 
development of the economy in the context of 
globalization. 
 
According to the authors, the red tape reduction 
in the economic life is of priority in Russia, in 
order to allow business to depend only on the 
law, rather than on its loyalty to the government. 
The authors have noted the need for a real, strong 
political opposition, the importance of creating 
conditions for the media independent of the state, 
ensuring the openness of political decision-
making for society, and the succession of 
political elites. The authors hope that such 
conditions will be created in Russia in the next 
six to ten years. Nurturing a political culture of a 
fundamentally new type, aimed at creating a civil 
type of culture in Russia, is one of the ways to 
create these conditions. Political education and 
the study of the characteristics of political power 
and the specifics of the political regime 
transformation in Russia by citizens are 
promising directions in the political activities of 
state authorities. 
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